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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that whereas an explosive was sufficient to confer a cause of action on
an infant some fifty years ago, today there need only be a defectively-
covered platform opening. The instant decision indicates that while
New York formally rejects the attractive nuisance doctrine, it will, in
effect, apply its equitable results when the circumstances of the case
require it.
A
TORTS - VETERANS COMPENSATION - CONCURRENT REMEDY
UNDER TORT CLAIMS ACT ALLoWED.-Plaintiff, a veteran, sought
recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained
during an operation performed at a Veterans Administration hospital.
An allegedly defective tourniquet, applied by an attendant, had aggra-
vated a knee injury which the plaintiff incurred during World War II.
Subsequent to the operation, but prior to this action, a veterans com-
pensation award for the original injury was increased. The Court
held that the action was maintainable since the injury had not been
sustained "incident to service," and that the plaintiff was not pre-
cluded from recovery by the receipt of disability payments under the
Veterans Act. United States v. Brown, 75 Sup. Ct. 141 (1954).
Although the Federal Tort Claims Act I contains twelve excep-
tions to governmental liability,2 it does not deny military personnel
the right to sue. Because of the compensation benefits available under
the various veterans acts,3 the unique relationship that exists between
the serviceman and the Government,4 and the possible adverse effects
on military discipline,5 the courts have found the problem of suits by
the military a vexatious one. The Supreme Court first dealt with
the question in Brooks v. United States.6 In that case, the Court
reasoned that since the accident had occurred while the servicemen
were on leave, there was no connection between the tort and the mili-
tary status of the petitioners. Consequently, the cause of action was
not barred by the Government-serviceman relationship. In addition,
the Court, in permitting recovery, held that the receipt of veterans
compensation for the injuries did not constitute an election of rem-
'28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1952).
2 Id. § 2680.
3 See Title 38 of the United States Code.
4 "Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more dis-
tinctively federal in character than that between it and members of its armed
forces." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947). See
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141-144 (1950).5 See United States v. Brown, 75 Sup. Ct. 141, 143 (1954).
6337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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edies.7 Thus, the Court allowed two remedies, but remanded the
case to the court of appeals, suggesting that a suitable deduction be
made for the compensation received.
8
An important limitation on the holding in the Brooks decision
was the Court's implication that a different result would have been
reached if the injuries had been sustained "incident to service." 9 This
implication was elevated to a holding in Feres v. United States,10
wherein all the claimants were on active duty and not on furlough
when injured. The Court denied recovery because of the special
character of the Government-serviceman relationship. Moreover, in
apparent repudiation of the concurrent remedies doctrine of the Brooks
case, much emphasis was placed upon the receipt of veterans com-
pensation. The Court noted that "[t] he primary purpose of the
[Federal Tort Claims] Act was to extend a remedy to those who had
been without [one]. . . ." 1 Further, the Court observed that "[i]f
Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply
in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why it should have omitted
any provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other." 12
In considering the question of governmental liability to persons
injured in veterans hospitals, lower courts could not agree on whether
such injury was incurred as an incident to service and whether the
serviceman in such case had a single or dual remedy.' 3 The Veterans
Act added to the confusion, since, by its terms, injuries incurred in
veterans hospitals were to be considered "service connected" and,
therefore, subject to compensation.' 4 In the instant case, the court
7"We will not call either remedy in the present case exclusive, nor pro-
nounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not done so."
Id. at 53.
8 "We conclude that the language, framework and legislative history of
the Tort Claims Act require a holding that petitioners' actions were well
founded. But we remand to the Court of Appeals for its consideration of the
problem of reducing damages pro tanto, should it decide that such consideration
is proper in view of the District Court judgment and the parties' allegations
of error." Id. at 54. See United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir.
1949) (wherein the court held that the tort damages should be reduced by the
amount of past and prospective receipts of compensation).
9 See Brooks v. United States, supra note 6 at 52.
10340 U.S. 135 (1950). The Court decided three cases in this opinion. In
the Feres case the decedent perished by fire while quartered in barracks alleged
to have been unsafe. The Jefferson case involved the negligence of an army
surgeon who left a towel in the stomach of the plaintiff after an operation.
The executrix in the Griggs case alleged that the decedent died as the result of
negligent treatment by army surgeons.
11 Id. at 140.
12 Id. at 144.
13 See, e.g., O'Neil v. United States, 202 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1953) ; Santana
v. United States, 175 F.2d 320 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Pettis v. United States, 108 F.
Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ; Bandy v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 360 (D. Nev.
1950).
14 "Where any veteran suffers . . . an injury, or an aggravation of any
existing injury, as the result of hospitalization or medical or surgical treatment
1955]
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of appeals, holding the Brooks decision to be controlling, reversed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint. 15 The Supreme Court
affirmed,16 pointing out that although the causal relation was sufficient
to bring the claim under the Veterans Act, the injury had not been
incurred "incident to service" in the sense used in the Feres case.1 7
The Court also adhered to the recommendation in the Brooks
opinion that the tort damages be reduced by the compensation re-
ceived. Thus the Court ignored its own arguments for an exclusive
remedy as set forth in the Feres decision 'I and their outright adop-
tion of that theory in Johansen v. United States.'0 By reverting to
the concurrent remedies doctrine of the Brooks case, the Court also
revived the problem of adjusting damages.20  In the reduction of tort
damages pursuant to the method delineated in the Brooks case, it is
necessary to consider prospective as well as past receipts of compen-
sation by the veteran. 21 This system is by no means foolproof, how-
ever, since veterans compensation is subject to change at any time.22
In addition, a veteran could avoid any mitigation of his tort damages
by not filing his claim with the Veterans Administration until after
he received judgment. 23  When the Solicitor of the Veterans Admin-
istration dealt with the disposition of Brooks' compensation following
his tort recovery, he pointed out that, even in the event of duplica-
tion, he had no authority to withhold or reduce a compensation
award.24  In a similar decision, the Administrator declared that the
Veterans Administration would follow the Solicitor's opinion in the
Brooks case in the absence of statutory power to adjust compensation
to tort damages. 25 The Administrator noted, however, that for over
... benefits . . . shall be awarded in the same manner as if such disability,
aggravation, or death were service connected.. . ." 48 STAT. 526 (1934), 38
U.S.C. § 501a (1952).
15 Brown v. United States, 209 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1954).
16 Since the Veterans Administration hospital is located in New York, the
Court thought the claim might he cognizable under local law, citing Sheehan
v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937).
17 United States v. Brown, 75 Sup. Ct. 141, 143 (1954).
18 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
19 343 U.S. 427 (1952). There, in construing a statute analogous to veterans
compensation, the Court held that the Federal Employees Compensation Act
was the plaintiff's sole remedy. The Court reasoned that although Congress
had not specifically excluded the plaintiff from the coverage of the Public
Vessels Act, the latter must be fitted into the entire statutory system of rem-
edies and that "[tihis Court accepted the principle of the exclusive character
of federal plans for compensation in Feres v. United States. Id. at 440.
20 See note 8 su pra.2 See United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Bandy v.
United States, 92 F. Supp. 360, 365 (D. Nev. 1950).
22 See United States v. Brooks, supra note 21.
23 1 DECISIONS OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATOR No. 897, p. 102 n.9 (6th
Supp. 1952).
24 See Solicitor's Opinion, quoted in 1 DECISIONS OF THE VETERANS ADMIN-
ISTRATOR No. 897, p. 105 (6th Supp. 1952).25 !d. at 107-108.
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a century legislation and judicial precedent have avoided the duplica-
tion of remedies.26 In line with this policy, he indicated his approval
of some plan, similar to workmen's compensation, which would make
veterans compensation the exclusive remedy.27  This is the only logi-
cal and consistent solution to the problem. 28  The allowance of con-
current remedies results at best in unnecessary complication and
confusion and, at worst, in duplication. It is submitted that the situ-
ation can only be corrected by legislative action.
X
TORTS - WRONGFUL DEATH - MAINTENANCE OF ACTION
AGAINST NEGLIGENT SOLE BENEFICIARY ALLoWED.-In an action
for wrongful death, plaintiff-administratrix sued decedent's negligent
husband, who was the sole statutory beneficiary of the decedent. The
defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred
as a matter of law. In affirming the denial of the motion, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that, although a negligent sole statutory
beneficiary is precluded from sharing in any recovery, the action could
be maintained in view of the statutory provision for deduction, before
distribution, of the cost of recovery and the expenses of administra-
tion, burial, and last sickness. Pike v. Adams, 108 A.2d 55 (N.H.
1954).
Wrongful death statutes, although a great improvement over the
common law,' nevertheless present many problems,2 not the least of
which is the status of the negligent sole beneficiary.3  Some jurisdic-
26Id. at 104-105.
27 Id. at 107 n.14. For a comparison between veterans compensation and
workmen's compensation, see Note, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. RFv. 90, 98-101 (1951).
28 "This Act, however, should be construed to -fit, so far as will comport
with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies against the Gov-
ernment to make a workable, consistent and equitable whole." Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
1 At common law there could be no action for trespass when a felonious
act was included in the res gestae. Since homicide was presumably a felony,
no civil action could be maintained against one who negligently caused the
death of another. The numerous railway accidents of the middle nineteenth
century brought to light the harsh effects of this lack of remedy. See PoLLocK,
ToRTs 54 (15th ed., Landon, 1951). The resulting dissatisfaction culminated
in the passage in 1846 of Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act, 1846,
9 & 10 VIcr., c. 93), after which the great majority of American death statutes
are patterned. See PRossER, TORTS 955-956 (1941).
2 See PRossER, ToRTs 971 (1941).
3 This article is concerned only with negligent sole beneficiaries. However,
where such negligent person is not the sole beneficiary, but one of several, the
general view is that he alone is precluded from recovery. His negligence has
no effect on the recovery of the other beneficiaries. See, e.g., Bowler v. Roos,
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